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We present a new approach to study empirically the eect of the introduction of the euro
on the pattern of currency invoicing. Our approach uses a compositional multinomial
logit model, in which currency choice is explained by both currency-specic and country-
specic determinants. We use unique quarterly panel data on the invoicing of Norwegian
imports from OECD countries for the 1996{2006 period. We nd that eurozone countries
have substantially increased their share of home currency invoicing after the introduction
of the euro, whereas the home currency share of non-eurozone countries fell slightly.
In addition, the euro as a vehicle currency has overtaken the role of the US dollar in
Norwegian imports. The substantial rise in producer currency invoicing by eurozone
countries is primarily caused by a drop in ination volatility and can only to a small
extent be explained by an unobserved euro eect.
JEL codes: F33, F41, F42, E31, C25
Keywords: euro, invoicing currency, exchange rate risk, ination volatility, vehicle
currencies, compositional multinomial logitNon-Technical Summary
Currency invoicing of international goods trade has interested academics and policy makers
as early as the 1970s when the Bretton Woods system of xed but adjustable exchange rates
collapsed and the main trading countries in the world moved to exible exchange rates. The
introduction of the euro in non-cash form (i.e., electronic transfers, banking, etcetera) on
January 1, 1999 and in cash form on January 1, 2002 has brought currency invoicing to
the fore. Informal evidence points to a substantial impact of the euro on traders' choice of
invoicing currency. Little formal evidence on the euro's eect on currency invoicing exists.
A notable exception is the work by Kamps (2006). This paper studies whether the euro has
aected the choice of invoicing currency.
At rst sight, the answer to our research question seems an obvious `yes' given that
the euro did not exist prior to 1999. However, we are interested in measuring whether the
euro has had an eect on the home currency share of eurozone exporters (so-called producer
currency invoicing) above and beyond their home currency share prior to euro introduction.
In addition, we measure the euro's eect on the share of the importer's home currency and
the shares of the respective vehicle currencies (which refer to any third currency used in a
bilateral trading relationship). To this end, we use an invoicing data set covering Norwegian
goods imports from OECD countries during the 1996{2006 period. We have chosen Norway
because it: (i) is not part of the eurozone; and (ii) obtains almost 40 percent of its imports
from eurozone countries. The data span allows us to examine invoicing patterns before, during
transition, and after the introduction of the euro.
So far, the empirical invoicing literature has only used explanatory variables related to
the partner countries in trade (so-called country-specic variables). This paper introduces a
new approach that relates explanatory variables to the currencies (so-called currency-specic
variables). More specically, the new approach makes it possible to relate traders' invoicing
motives directly to the currency attributes, that is, a euro dummy, a euro transition dummy,
exchange rate volatility of the chosen currency with respect to the local currency (Norwegian
krone), exchange rate volatility of the chosen currency with respect to the partner currency,and the depth of the currency's foreign exchange market.
The descriptive analysis shows a substantial change in invoicing patterns induced by euro
introduction. Norway's trading partners participating in the eurozone use their own currency
(i.e., the euro) more frequently than before the introduction of the euro. Compared to the
non-eurozone control group, the producer currency invoicing share of eurozone countries rises
on average by 32.6 percentage points after euro introduction. We also nd that the euro is
chosen more often as a vehicle currency than the US dollar. The share of the US dollar in
vehicle currencies used in Norwegian imports drops from 52.7 percent in 1996 to 41.5 percent
in 2006.
The econometric analysis shows that above and beyond the control variables, the introduc-
tion of the euro has increased the share of producer currency invoicing by eurozone countries.
However, the unobserved eect of euro introduction|e.g., trust in the common currency|is
rather modest, that is, on average, we nd a 2 percentage points rise in invoicing in producer
currencies by eurozone countries. The increase in euro invoicing is primarily caused by a
drop in ination volatility induced by the process of monetary unication. The larger euro
invoicing share in Norwegian imports has increased ceteris paribus Norway's trade account
exposure to exchange rate changes. A depreciation of the Norwegian krone would lead to
more `imported ination' and a larger trade decit than before the introduction of the euro.1 Introduction
Currency invoicing of international goods trade has interested academics and policy makers
as early as the 1970s when the Bretton Woods system of xed but adjustable exchange rates
collapsed and the principal trading countries in the world moved to exible exchange rates.
The introduction of the euro in non-cash form (i.e., electronic transfers, banking, etcetera)
on January 1, 1999 and in cash form on January 1, 20021 has given a renewed impetus to
the invoicing literature.2 The introduction of the euro is believed to have had a substantial
impact on traders' choice of invoicing currency. More specically, the euro would boost
home currency invoicing by rms located in eurozone countries and euro use by non-eurozone
exporters trading with eurozone countries.3 This paper empirically investigates whether a
country's pattern of invoicing currency choice is aected by euro introduction.
Knowing which factors aect the pattern of invoicing is important on three accounts.
The rst reason is that invoicing patterns matter for how a country's trade balance responds
to a change in its exchange rate. If countries' exports are fully invoiced in the exporter's
currency (and thus imports are by denition invoiced in a foreign currency), a depreciation of
the exporter's currency|given that trade contracts are given in the short run|would cause
an initial worsening of the trade balance.4 Second, the choice of invoicing currency aects
the degree to which import prices are aected by exchange rate movements, the so-called
exchange rate `pass-through.'5 Finally, from a microeconomic point of view, the choice of
invoicing currency determines a rm's exposure to exchange risk. If a transaction is invoiced
in any other currency than its own, a trading rm is exposed to exchange rate uncertainty,
leading to revenue uncertainty.
1The euro was introduced on January 1, 1999 in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Greece joined on January 1, 2001, bringing the total
number of European Union (EU) member states adopting the euro (the so-called eurozone) to 12 countries.
Nowadays, the eurozone consists of 17 countries.
2The `New Open Economy Macroeconomics' literature based on Obstfeld and Rogo's (1995) paper also
contributed to this revival. See Section 2 for a further discussion.
3Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2005) present a theoretical analysis, whereas Kamps (2006) and Goldberg
and Tille (2008) provide empirical evidence.
4See Melvin and Sultan (1990) for an empirical study on the link between invoicing currency patterns and
the impact of a currency depreciation on the balance of trade.
5In fact, Gopinath et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence that currency choice is crucial for understanding
exchange rate pass-through. There is an extensive literature on exchange rate pass-through. Feenstra (1989)
and Feenstra et al. (1996) are early contributions.
1Little is known empirically about the determinants of invoicing currency choice, let alone
the eect of currency unions on invoicing patterns. The limited number of studies no doubt
reects the considerable condentiality with which the invoicing data are treated by central
banks and customs oces. Recently, a few econometric studies have studied invoicing deter-
minants.6 Our work is most closely related to the unpublished study by Kamps (2006), who
empirically assesses the eect of a country's eurozone membership on the invoicing share of
the euro, the US dollar, and a country's home currency. To this end, she uses cross-country
invoicing data at an annual frequency. Because of her focus on a single aggregate currency
share in each equation, Kamps (2006) cannot analyze the eect of the euro on invoicing
patterns, that is, the system of all currency shares. Furthermore, the annual frequency of
her data in combination with the short time span of analysis makes it hard to separate the
transition eect from the steady-state eect of euro introduction.
To investigate the eect of euro introduction on individual currencies and currency groups
during the two stages of euro introduction, we use a unique invoicing data set for Norway.
We have chosen Norway because it is not part of the eurozone, which allows the study of
the eect of the euro on partner currency use in Norwegian imports from eurozone countries
and on vehicle currency invoicing in Norwegian imports from countries outside the eurozone.7
Furthermore, with Germany as its second most important trading partner, Norway obtains
almost 40 percent of its imports from eurozone countries. The data consist of the value
of Norwegian (non-oil) goods imports broken down by country and currency for the period
1996{2006 and are measured at a quarterly frequency. These data are used to derive bilateral
currency shares for all the currencies of OECD countries. The econometric analysis includes
29 OECD countries, roughly capturing 85 percent of Norwegian imports.8 The invoicing data
used in this study span the period prior to euro introduction, the transition period 1999{2001
6Donnenfeld and Haug (2003), Wilander (2006), Fischer et al. (2007), Ligthart and Da Silva (2007),
Donnenfeld and Haug (2008), Friberg and Wilander (2008), Ito et al. (2010), and Goldberg and Tille (2011)
study the invoicing determinants using data for a single country. Kamps (2006) and Goldberg and Tille (2008)
employ aggregate cross-country invoicing data. See Section 2 for a further discussion.
7A `vehicle currency' or `third currency' is neither the currency of the exporter nor that of the importer in
a trade transaction. We will use the terminology vehicle currency and third currency interchangeably.
8Because we focus on industrialized countries, we do not include large emerging economies, such as Brazil,
Russia, India, and China. Note that the share of these four countries in Norwegian imports is negligible (about
7 percent). Furthermore, restricting our sample to OECD countries prevents large data gaps, which may bias
our results.
2(when both the euro and national legacy currencies could be used in trade), and a suciently
large post-transition period.9
We employ a compositional multinomial logit approach that weights the probability of
traders choosing a particular currency by the respective currency share. This approach is
appropriate because we have compositional data, that is, the currency shares lie in the closed
unit interval [0;1], add up to unity for a particular country at one point in time, and are cor-
related.10 Our analysis incorporates the characteristics of 31 currencies and thus goes beyond
just characterizing the determinants of a single currency share. Hence, we are able to capture
substitution eects between currencies due to euro introduction. We employ a euro dummy
for the time period 1999Q1{2006Q4 to capture an unobserved euro eect (e.g., more trust in
the common currency). In addition, a euro control dummy is introduced to describe legacy
currency invoicing during the transition period. Finally, we employ both xed eects and
pooled models, where the former specication controls for unobserved heterogeneity across
countries.
So far, the empirical invoicing literature has only used explanatory variables related to
the partner countries in trade. These so-called country-specic variables do not vary across
currencies. For example, a country's share in world trade and the share of dierentiated
products in the partner country's export package. This study introduces a new approach
that relates covariates to the currencies, thereby introducing currency-specic variables (e.g.,
the size of the foreign exchange market) in addition to allowing country-specic covariates.
Because we control for currency-specic determinants, we refer to a conditional compositional
multinomial logit model.11 More specically, our approach makes it possible to relate traders'
invoicing motives directly to the currency attributes, that is, a euro dummy, a euro transition
dummy, exchange rate volatility of the chosen currency with respect to the local currency
(the Norwegian krone, NOK), exchange rate volatility of the chosen currency with respect
to the partner currency, and the depth of the currency's foreign exchange market. Besides
9Legacy currencies are the currencies of the eurozone members that ceased to exist at the end of the
transition period toward euro introduction.
10A simple logistic transformation cannot be employed in this case. See Section 4 for a further discussion.
11The discrete choice literature usually refers to the distinction between country-specic and currency-specic
regressors as `alternative-invariant' and `alternative-varying' regressors, respectively.
3these methodological extensions, the paper also contributes to the invoicing literature more
generally by considering a broader set of covariates (including ination volatility) than has
been studied before and by deriving average marginal eects in the context of a nonlinear
invoicing model.12
We nd in the descriptive analysis that Norway's trading partners participating in the
eurozone use their own currency more frequently than before the introduction of the euro,
whereas non-eurozone partners invoice less frequently in their home currency. However, the
rise in the producer currency share of eurozone countries can only be partly attributed to
a substitution from eurozone vehicle currencies to the euro. We also nd that the euro
is chosen more often as a vehicle currency than the US dollar. The econometric results
for the xed eects benchmark model show that above and beyond the control variables,
the introduction of the euro has had a signicant positive eect on the euro share. Euro
introduction increases eurozone countries' share of producer currency invoicing (i.e., invoicing
in the home currency by the exporter) by 2.6 percentage points. If the euro is chosen as
a vehicle currency by non-eurozone countries its share rises by 3 percentage points. This
unobserved euro eect only materialized gradually, reecting the three-year transition phase
and hysteresis in invoicing practices. We further nd that the substantial rise in producer
currency invoicing by eurozone countries is primarily caused by a drop in ination volatility
and can only to a small extent be explained by an unobserved euro eect. In the pooled
model, invoicing in producer currencies increases if the size of the foreign exchange market is
large, the degree of product dierentiation is small, and the rate of ination is low. The world
trade share of a country is only signicantly positive in a pooled model with country-specic
variables.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
derives various currency shares and describes invoicing patterns in Norwegian imports using
currency share data. Section 4 discusses the econometric methodology. Section 5 presents the
results on the invoicing eect of the euro while controlling for other determinants of invoicing
currency choice. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
12Previous invoicing studies that used nonlinear models have focused on the qualitative eects of a particular
determinant rather than its quantitative impact.
42 Related Literature
The theoretical literature on the invoicing eects of euro introduction|and monetary inte-
gration more generally|is rather small. Bacchetta and Van Wincoop's (2005) two-country
general equilibrium model on invoicing currency choice is a notable exception. They hypoth-
esize that if a set of countries form a monetary union they are more likely to invoice in the
union's currency. Intuitively, if multiple countries adopt the same currency, the market share
that matters is that of the entire currency union, not that of individual countries. The study
of Devereux et al. (2004) deals with a potential indirect eect of monetary integration. They
argue that exporters and importers will generally prefer to set prices in the currency of the
country with a more stable monetary policy, as given by the variance of the relative money
supplies.
The studies of Devereux et al. (2004) and Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2005) build on
the New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature, which is primarily initiated by the work
of Obstfeld and Rogo (1995). They developed a two-country general equilibrium model of
exchange rate determination, which is also known as the Redux model. Key features of this
research line are monopolistic competition on goods and/or labor markets and sticky nominal
prices pre-set in a particular currency. An important issue in this literature is in which
currency prices are assumed to be sticky. The Redux model assumes producer currency
pricing (PCP), that is, exporters set prices in their home currency. Accordingly, there is
complete exchange rate pass-through of prices of imported goods to prices of domestic goods,
ensuring that purchasing power parity holds at all times. However, Betts and Devereux
(2000) show that the expenditure-switching eect of a nominal exchange rate change under
PCP breaks down if rms engage in local currency pricing (LCP), that is, exporters pre-set
prices and invoice in the importer's currency.13 All these studies assume an exogenously given
invoicing currency. Devereux et al. (2004) and Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2005) are some
of the few studies to endogenize the invoicing currency share.
Table 1 presents an overview of the econometric studies that investigate the determinants
of invoicing currency choice. The majority of studies employ aggregate invoicing data in the
13Krugman (1987) was one of the rst authors to point out that foreign rms price locally.
5form of currency shares (labeled A in column (4) of the table), which are either bilateral
currency shares for a single country or country-level shares in a cross-country setting (see
column (3) of the table). Single-country studies based on aggregate share data have been
conducted for Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States. Kamps (2006)
and Goldberg and Tille (2008) make use of aggregate cross-country invoicing data for a
small sample of countries. The unpublished studies by Wilander (2006) and Goldberg and
Tille (2011) are the only ones based on transaction-level invoicing data (labeled by T in the
table). Fischer et al. (2007), Friberg and Wilander (2008), and Ito et al. (2010) employ
survey data for Switzerland, Sweden, and Japan, respectively. Most of the studies show that
a country's market power|measured in terms of a country's world export share or Gross
Domestic Product (GDP)|leads to increased invoicing of its home currency. In addition,
the degree of product dierentiation negatively aects the use of vehicle currencies. Using
invoicing data for the Netherlands, Ligthart and Da Silva (2007) nd home currency invoicing
to be positively aected by the rate of ination in the partner country and negatively aected
by the degree of development of the partner country's banking sector. They also nd that
EU countries invoice less in vehicle currencies as is also found by Wilander (2006). Fischer et
al. (2007) and Friberg and Wilander (2008) emphasize the role of rm size; small exporting
rms are more likely to use their home currency.
The study by Kamps (2006) is the only one that empirically assesses the eect of euro
introduction on currency invoicing. She regresses both the euro and US dollar share on a set of
explanatory variables in separate regression equations. She additionally analyzes a country's
home currency share in exports and imports. Her analysis covers 42 countries and uses
annual data for the 1994{2004 period.14 Kamps nds that the introduction of the euro and a
country being a member of the EU or an EU accession candidate increases producer currency
invoicing. In addition, the share of euro invoicing rises if a country pegs its currency to the
euro, has a larger share of dierentiated products in exports, trades more with the eurozone,
and is an EU member. Countries' US dollar share in invoicing is negatively aected by their
14Her study is the rst to put together a large cross-country data set. However, the data set is highly
unbalanced, reecting the scarcity of invoicing data at the cross-country level. Some countries have data
covering the whole time period, whereas only individual years are observed for other countries. Only 19 of the
42 countries are included in the euro analysis.
6membership of the eurozone.
More remotely connected to our work are the studies by Wilander (2006) and Goldberg
and Tille (2008). Wilander's (2006) analysis includes an Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) dummy, taking on the value of one if a country is an EMU member. However, his
period of analysis covers 1999{2002 and thus does not capture the period before and after
euro introduction. He nds that EMU membership increases the use of the local currency.
Goldberg and Tille (2008) study vehicle currency invoicing by using the invoicing share of
the US dollar and the euro as the respective dependent variables. Their analysis consists
of 24 countries (including among others nine EU accession countries, Australia, Japan, and
the United States) and uses annual observations for 1996{2003. They include an EU dummy
and therefore cannot distinguish between eurozone and non-eurozone members. Goldberg
and Tille (2008) nd that the US dollar is predominantly used in countries' invoicing of
goods trade with the United States and in the setting of prices of goods traded on organized
exchanges. They also show that the euro is primarily employed as an invoicing currency by
countries trading a substantial share of their goods with the EU.
3 Invoicing Currency Shares
This section denes various invoicing currency shares and provides a descriptive analysis of
the currency shares in Norwegian goods imports.
3.1 Currency Share Denitions
Our analysis uses quarterly data on the aggregate value of Norwegian goods imports broken
down by the currency of payment and the country of the trading partner for the 1996{2006
period. We include 29 OECD countries|i.e., all OECD member countries in 2006, excluding
Norway|which covers roughly 85 percent of total Norwegian goods imports. The data used
in this study have been collected by the Norwegian customs oce. The Norwegian customs
law requires traders to report all goods trade transactions of a value exceeding NOK 10,000
(euro 1,127). Besides the transaction value, transaction volume, and type of commodity,
7traders have to report the currency of payment. A small fraction of trade is censored by
the reporting threshold; it does not exceed 5 percent in imports from any partner country
and amounts to less than 3 percent of the aggregate import value. Because of condentiality
concerns, we do not have access to rm-level transactions. In addition, transactions in the
oil and shipping sector|in which just a few large rms are active|are excluded from the
reported data. Finally, we cannot observe the currency of invoicing. In the following, we
assume that the currency of payment in any period is equal to the currency of invoicing.
Friberg and Wilander (2008) point out that in more than 90 percent of the cases the two
coincide.
In the econometric analysis of Section 4, we make use of invoicing currency shares, which
are calculated as follows. Let us dene mjnt to denote Norway's bilateral imports (which
are measured in Norwegian krones) invoiced in currency j = 1;:::;J in trade with country
n = 1;:::;N in quarter t = 1;:::;T. Dividing mjnt by country n's exports to Norway at time






; 0  sjnt  1;
J X
j=1
sjnt = 1: (1)
We have corrected mjnt for changes in the average exchange rate of the Norwegian krone with
respect to each currency in the sample (Table A.1 in the Appendix). The J currency shares
represent compositional data; that is, the shares are bounded on the [0;1] interval and add
up to unity. In addition, the shares are not independent of each other because they have the
same denominator; that is, Cov(sjnt;sknt) 6= 0 for any two currency shares j and k for j 6= k.
We distinguish a maximum of J = 31 currencies and compute the corresponding bilateral
currency shares. We focus only on currencies of OECD countries because no other currencies
outside the OECD were actually chosen. Furthermore, it would be computationally demand-
ing to distinguish all currencies in the world. Note that the set of currencies that is eectively
available for use in the OECD area falls over time, reecting the phasing out of currencies as-
sociated with euro introduction. During the 1996{1998 period, traders could use a maximum
of 31 currencies, consisting of the currencies of OECD member countries and the European
8Currency Unit (ECU). For the 1999{2001 period, traders could potentially choose one of
30 currencies of the OECD member countries plus the euro. Finally, during the 2002{2006
period, 19 currencies are available; that is, all the currencies of OECD member countries,
excluding the national legacy currencies and the ECU. Table A.2 shows the currency shares
averaged over time and countries. The Norwegian krone, the euro, and the US dollar are the
most frequently used. Out of 31 currencies ve currencies are never chosen (i.e., the Hun-
garian forint, the Mexican peso, the Slovak koruna, the South Korean won, and the Turkish
lira), but these will nevertheless be included in the econometric analysis of Sections 4{5.
To permit a graphical analysis of the currency shares, we classify the currencies in three
mutually exclusive groups. The rst group is local currency invoicing (LCI), which refers to
invoicing in the currency of the country where the exporter's goods are sold. In our case, the
local currency is the Norwegian krone. The second group is called producer currency invoicing
(PCI). For all partner countries that are not part of the eurozone, there is only one producer
currency. Countries that are part of the eurozone have one producer currency until 1999 (i.e.,
their national currency), two producer currencies between 1999 and 2002 (i.e., their national
legacy currency and the euro), and one producer currency from 2002 onwards (i.e., the euro).
Finally, the third group is vehicle currency invoicing (VCI), which refers to invoicing of trade
transactions in a third currency. The VCI group consists of all currencies excluding the
Norwegian krone and the trading partner's currency. Using this currency grouping, we can









where mvnt is the sum of Norway's imports from country n invoiced in currencies belonging
to group v = 1;:::;V (where V = 3 corresponds to the three currency groups LCI, PCI, and
VCI, respectively), Jv is the number of currencies in group v, and J = JLCI + JPCI + JVCI.
The next step is to calculate the aggregate currency group shares, where we aggregate
across countries. We take two approaches. The rst approach corrects for trade value dier-
ences across countries. Norway's ve biggest OECD trading partners make up more than 50
percent of its imports. To preclude that the invoicing of Norwegian imports from large trading
9partners overshadows that of smaller trading partners, we calculate equally-weighted currency





svnt is dened in (2) and the label E denotes equally-weighted currency group shares. The
second approach calculates trade-weighted currency group shares (labeled by T) as follows:
sT
vt = mvt PV
v=1
PN
n=1 mvnt, where mvt =
PN
n=1 mvnt. The currency shares in Norwegian imports
are analyzed in Section 3.2.
3.2 Descriptive Analysis
Table 2 shows the bilateral currency shares for currency groups and the partner country's share
in Norwegian imports.15 The PCI share varies substantially across countries, ranging from 0
to 75.3 percent. There is no clear link between the partner country's home currency share and
its share in Norwegian imports. The home currency share of Norway's most important trading
partner (Sweden) amounts to 45.9 percent, whereas that of its second most important trading
partner (Germany) is 73.5 percent. In addition, although Poland is ranked as Norway's 15th
largest trading partner, the share of the Polish Zloty is very small. More generally, many
countries that joined the OECD in the second half of the 1990s have a negligible or zero PCI
share.
Norway's ve biggest trading partners|equally weighted|invoice on average 30 percent
of their exports to Norway in the local currency (Norwegian krone), 55 percent in their home
(producer) currency, and 15 percent in vehicle currencies. This invoicing pattern supports
`Grassman's law,' which says that trade between industrialized countries is mainly invoiced
in the currency of the exporter.16 Averaged across all OECD countries and time periods,
however, the invoicing of Norwegian imports looks quite dierent: 35.4 percent is invoiced
in the Norwegian krone, 31.2 percent in producer currencies, and 33.3 percent in vehicle
currencies.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the average currency group shares of eurozone countries,
15Ligthart and Werner (2011) provide descriptive statistics for Norwegian exports.
16Grassman (1973) nds in his descriptive analysis of Swedish goods trade that two-thirds of exports to
industrialized countries are invoiced in the producer's currency and a quarter are invoiced in the local currency.
Because other authors found similar invoicing patterns, the invoicing literature refers to `Grassman's law.' See
Ligthart and Da Silva (2007) for further references.
10whereas Panel (b) presents the trade-weighted currency group shares. The introduction of
the euro as a virtual currency in 1999 is indicated by the rst dotted vertical line. The second
dotted vertical line depicts the date of introduction of the euro in cash transactions in 2002,
at which date the national currencies of the eurozone member states ceased to be legal tender.
Panel (a) shows that the equally-weighted currency shares of eurozone countries have been
aected considerably by the introduction of the euro. Before the introduction of the euro,
imports from the eurozone are mainly invoiced in the Norwegian krone. Indeed, we can see
that the average PCI share of 30 percent (denoted by the dashed line) is only slightly above
that of vehicle currencies, implying a failure of Grassman's law. After the introduction of
the euro in cash form, however, the PCI share rises substantially|reaching nearly 60 percent
in 2003Q1|and becomes dominant in 2001Q2. Hence, Grassman's law is supported after
mid-2001. The the PCI share rises at the expense of the LCI and VCI shares (the solid and
dotted lines, respectively).
Panel (b) of Figure 1 depicts that the trade-weighted currency group shares are in line
with Grassman's law across the entire time period. In addition, the introduction of the
euro seems to have also aected the trade-weighted currency shares, although the eects
are less pronounced as for the case of equally-weighted currency shares. At the individual
country level, we nd the largest rise in the PCI share after euro introduction for Greece (52
percentage points), Luxembourg (50 percentage points), Spain (37.2 percentage points), and
Portugal (34.7 percentage points), each of which have very small shares (less than 2 percent)
in trade with Norway.17 However, the PCI share of Germany|which provides 16.4 percent
of Norwegian imports from OECD countries|rises by less than 1 percentage point. Because
Norway's smaller trading partners get a greater weight in the equally-weighted analysis than
in the trade-weighted analysis, we nd a larger euro eect for the former specication.
To investigate whether the rise in the PCI share has happened exclusively in the eurozone,
we compare it to the PCI share of non-eurozone countries in our sample. Panels (c) and
17The gures are derived by comparing the average PCI share (expressed in percentages) during 1996{1999
period with that during the 2002{2006 period. Greece, Luxembourg, and Spain primarily switched away from
vehicle currency use (VCI declined from 39.4 percent before 1999 to 7.1 percent after 2002), whereas Portugal
mainly switched away from Norwegian krones (LCI dropped from 71.4 percent before 1999 to 50.6 percent
after 2002).
11(d) of Figure 1 reveal that the PCI share of non-eurozone countries (the dashed line) falls
slightly after the introduction of the euro, whereas the PCI share of eurozone countries rises
substantially. Compared to the non-eurozone control group, the eurozone PCI share rises on
average by 32.6 percentage points after euro introduction.18 One could argue that the rise in
the PCI share primarily reects a substitution from eurozone vehicle currencies to the euro.
For instance, Norwegian imports from Italy that used to be invoiced in German marks|which
counted toward VCI before euro introduction|are recorded as PCI after euro introduction.19
To get some idea about the potential size of this eect, we add the VCI share in Norwegian
trade with eurozone countries to the PCI share (see the bullet pointed line). After January 1,
2002, the PCI share is still 10 percentage points higher than the bullet-pointed line, thereby
providing support for a genuine euro eect.
Table 3 analyzes the composition of the trade-weighted vehicle currency share in Norwe-
gian imports before and after euro introduction. We can see that the euro as a vehicle currency
overtakes the US dollar after euro introduction. In 1996, the US dollar has the largest share
(52 percent), followed by the German mark (27 percent). The share of all vehicle curren-
cies belonging to the eurozone is 32 percent. The share of non-eurozone vehicle currencies
(excluding the US dollar) accounts for 15.1 percent; it consists primarily of the currencies
of Scandinavian partner countries (i.e., the Swedish krone and the Danish krone), together
accounting for 12 percent. However, the share of the Pound sterling|once a major vehicle
currency|is very small (2 percent). In 2006, the euro share amounts to 47.1 percent whereas
the US dollar share (41.5 percent) falls below the euro share. The overall decrease of the
VCI share in Norwegian imports partly reects the introduction of the euro, which increases
the PCI share in eurozone members.20 Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2 illustrate the change
in vehicle currency invoicing of Norwegian imports by non-eurozone countries (excluding the
18This gure is based on a simple dierence-in-dierence analysis. See Table A.9 of Ligthart and Werner
(2011) for further details.
19Although substituting from eurozone vehicle currencies to the euro does appear to be the most natural move
for traders, it should not be regarded as automatic and self-explanatory. Traders could also have substituted a
eurozone vehicle currency for a vehicle currency outside the eurozone, such as the US dollar, if they were not
convinced the euro to be as stable a currency as the German mark had been.
20Note that the average number of vehicle currencies used in Norwegian trade with eurozone countries
dropped from 16 to 9 after euro introduction (compared to a drop from 15 to 9 in imports from non-eurozone
members).
12United States) with a view to study vehicle currency invoicing outside the two monetary
blocks. It shows how the euro share gradually increases during the transition period at the
expense of the US dollar share. The share of other vehicle currencies remains rather stable
(see the dotted line).
4 Empirical Methodology
This section sets out the empirical model used to analyze the determinants of currency in-
voicing. The econometric framework builds on and extends two strands of literature: (i)
the discrete-choice literature on market share data (which is developed by Berry (1994) and
applied by Nevo (2001) in the eld of industrial organization); and (ii) the fractional response
analysis of Papke and Wooldridge (1996). Our novel approach in the trade invoicing literature
identies country-specic and currency-specic variables separately, whereas the invoicing lit-
erature has exclusively focused on country-specic variables. In addition, our approach goes
beyond Berry (1994)|who employs a logistic transformation of market shares|by taking
into account that shares may lie at the extreme values of zero and one.
4.1 Parameter Estimation
A common starting point to model an agent's choice among alternatives is the random utility
framework. In the context of invoicing, an optimizing exporter chooses the invoicing currency
that gives the highest payo in terms of utility. To facilitate the derivation of an estimating
equation, we are assuming that the exporter in the partner country chooses the currency.21
More formally, we dene the utility functional of trader i = 1;:::;I located in partner country





n + ijnt; (3)
21Alternatively, we could have assumed that the Norwegian importer is choosing the currency. In practice,
the currency choice is the result of bargaining between two trading parties. Viaene and De Vries (1992),
Donnenfeld and Zilcha (1995), and Goldberg and Tille (2011) develop bargaining models to investigate the
invoicing currency choice.
13where z0
jnt is a 1  Hz row vector of explanatory variables related to currency j = 1;:::;J
in each quarter t, x0
nt is a 1  Hx row vector of explanatory variables pertaining to country
n in each quarter t, and Hq denotes the number of covariates in category q = fz;xg (see
below).22 A prime denotes a transpose. To model unobserved heterogeneity at the country
level, we include a 1  N row vector of dummies d0
n, which are equal to one in column n
and zero otherwise. Preferences of exporters dier by ijnt, which we take to have a known
distribution. Finally, , , and  are the coecient vectors to be estimated.
Because traders are likely to choose currencies according to their attributes (e.g., the size of
the exchange market or volatility of the exchange rate) and not only based on the (economic)
characteristics of the currency's jurisdiction (e.g., a country's world trade share), we include
both currency-specic and country-specic covariates in the estimating equation (Section 4.2).
Specifying covariates as currency-specic allows us to identify the attributes of all currencies
that could have been used in a trade transaction. For example, exchange rate volatility as a
currency-specic variable can capture the volatility of the exporter's currency with respect to
any currency choice. If exchange rate volatility were specied as a country-specic variable, it
only identies the exporter's currency and takes the same value for LCI (the Norwegian krone)
and any vehicle currency. Not all variables are suitable to be specied as currency specic.
Some variables (e.g., the exporter's world trade share) are better described as country specic.
The euro eect is measured by using either a country-specic dummy or a currency-specic
dummy.
Exporter i in country n chooses currency j at time t if and only if
Uijnt  Uiknt 8 k 6= j and k = 1;:::;J: (4)
Dene the set of values of ijnt that leads to the choice of currency j in trade with country n
at time t:
Ajnt = fijnt : Uijnt  Uiknt 8 k 6= j; k = 1;:::;Jg: (5)
22We use z
0
jnt instead of z
0
jt to allow one of the currency-specic variables to vary by country.
14Let   [  ]0 be a row vector containing all the parameters. The currency share j of





where F(ijnt) is the cumulative distribution function of ijnt and Znt is a J  Hz matrix
describing all currency choices J and their characteristics zj. If the ijnt's are distributed
independent and identically across rms, currencies, countries, and time periods with a Type












; j 6= k: (7)
A probability-based approach like (7) ensures that estimated currency shares for J currencies
satisfy the adding-up constraint [see (1)] and are bounded on the closed interval [0,1]. We
cannot use the much simpler logistic transformation because the shares might lie at the
extreme values of zero or one, making the transformation impossible. In addition, a logistic
transformation would also normalize to zero the coecient of the Norwegian krone as a
currency-specic variable, which is the base alternative for country-specic variables in our
model. Such a normalization implies a loss of information.
The country-specic coecient vectors  and  are only identied if we normalize one
currency choice to zero. We choose to set the parameters of the Norwegian krone (LCI)
to zero, leaving a parameter set for J   1 currency shares. Accordingly, the parameters in
the vectors  and  represent the dierence between the respective currency choice j and
the Norwegian krone. Without further restrictions, this approach would involve estimating
(N +Hx)(J  1) parameters for country-specic variables only. A more practical solution is
to split the country-specic parameter vectors into the aforementioned three currency groups.
We dene v and v for v 2 fLCI;PCI;VCIg and set LCI = LCI = 0. This procedure
implies that the parameters in the vectors V CI and V CI are identical across all vehicle
currencies. Similarly, PCI and PCI are common to the euro and the eurozone legacy
currencies that are used as PCI. More important, by distinguishing J  1 currency shares on
15the left-hand side, we can meaningfully include currency-specic variables.23 Obviously, the
parameter vector  remains unaected by the splitting procedure. Note that if equation (7)
had been specied without zjnt, we could have used just the three currency groups as the














8 j 6= k 6= LCI: (8)
Our model is a variant of the standard multinomial logit approach, which we call the
conditional compositional multinomial logit model. To arrive at the estimated coecient









where   [ PCI V CI PCI V CI]0 is a row vector with parameters and sjnt are the
observed currency shares. The estimated currency share functions are then the predicted
currency shares; that is, ^ Sjnt = ^ sjnt, where hats denote predicted values (Appendix A.1). We
use robust standard errors instead of standard errors clustered at the partner country level,
reecting the relatively small N.25
In the benchmark specication, we explicitly control for unobserved heterogeneity across
countries. To this end, we run a country-specic xed eects model. Because T = 44 is larger
than N = 29, we do not have to deal with the well-known incidental parameter problem. We
formally test whether we should employ a xed eects model or a pooled specication. Using
the likelihood ratio test under the null hypothesis that the pooled model and the xed eects
model are statistically the same, we nd:  2[lnL(av) lnL(d0
nv)] = 241:97 > 39:8 = 2(56),
where av is a common intercept per currency group and we have 2(N  1) = 56 restrictions.
The test statistic indicates that the hypothesis of poolability across countries can be rejected.
As a robustness check, we also consider a pooled model, where we replace d0
nv by av.
23For purposes of analyzing currency-specic variables, all potential currencies of OECD countries are in-
cluded even though ve currencies were never chosen at all.
24The Matlab program code is available from the authors upon request.
25We have only 29 clusters, which is of insucient size to use cluster-robust standard errors. Cameron et
al. (2008) argue that at least 50 clusters are needed for accurate inference.
164.2 Explanatory Variables
The analysis includes dummies to capture the introduction of the euro in non-cash form
and the transition period after introduction, a set of trade and trade-related variables, and
monetary variables. Table A.1 provides a detailed overview of the data sources and Table A.2
presents descriptive statistics.
4.2.1 Euro Dummies
To measure any unobserved eects on invoicing related to euro introduction (i.e., trust in the
stability of the common currency), we employ a euro dummy. Changes in euro invoicing due
to changes in fundamental variables (e.g., more price stability) should be captured suciently
by the respective regressors (Sections 4.2.2{4.2.3). As a currency-specic variable, the euro
dummy (denoted by EURjt) takes on a value of unity for the legacy currencies of the eurozone
countries and for the euro from January 1, 1999 onward and zero otherwise (where the legacy
currencies are included up to December 31, 2001).26 The euro as a currency-specic variable
measures the overall eect of euro introduction on the euro share in Norwegian imports
including its use as a producer currency and vehicle currency. The parameter of EURjt is
expected to have a positive sign, since partner countries will take advantage of the increased
market power bestowed upon them by the euro and trade less in any other currency than
their own. As a country-specic variable, the euro dummy (denoted by EURnt) takes on a
value of unity for all eurozone countries from January 1, 1999 onward. The country-specic
euro dummy measures the eect of eurozone membership on a partner country's LCI, PCI,
and VCI share. We expect a negative sign of the parameter of EURnt for LCI and VCI and
a positive sign for PCI.
From January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2001, the euro has been used in non-cash trade
transactions alongside the national currencies of the eurozone countries. To measure the
phasing out of the eurozone home currencies during the transition period, we use a dummy
variable EuroControljt that takes on a value of unity if one of the legacy currencies is chosen
26Note that the ocial date at which the national currencies of countries participating in the eurozone ceased
to be legal tender varied across member states, but lasted up to a maximum of two months after December
31, 2001. However, we do not dierentiate the date by country.
17during the transition period and zero otherwise. Based on the descriptive analysis in Section
3.2, we know that the euro slowly replaced the eurozone legacy currencies. Hence, we expect
a negative coecient of the EuroControljt dummy.
4.2.2 Monetary Variables
Magee and Rao (1980) hypothesize that trading rms are less likely to set their prices in
currencies of countries that exhibit a high rate of ination. A high ination rate weakens
a country's currency and erodes the real value of the rm's trade receipts. We include the
expected rate of ination of the partner country (CPI nt), which is calculated as the mean of
the consumer price index (CPI)-based ination rate of the last four quarters. It is expected
to have a negative eect on PCI by partner countries.
Cornell (1980) and Devereux et al. (2004) argue that the expected volatility of the part-
ner country's ination rate CPIVolnt will similarly have a negative eect on the use of the
producer currency, because risk-averse exporters will want to minimize the variance of their
receipts. Indeed, there are no appropriate instruments to hedge ination uncertainty. We
dene CPIVolnt as the standard deviation of a country's CPI over the last four quarters. As
a currency-specic variable, CPIVoljt is dened as the ination volatility of the country or
country group using currency j. We expect CPIVoljt to be negative across currency groups.
According to Swoboda (1968), traders prefer a currency that has a thick foreign exchange
market. Because of the smallness of a risk-averse trader relative to the market (atomicity),
the risk of capital loss in a thick market is smaller than in a thin market.27 We expect the
size of the foreign exchange market of currency j (denoted by SizeFX jt) to have a positive
eect on currency share j. Ligthart and Da Silva (2007) and Goldberg and Tille (2008)
measure the thickness of the foreign exchange market using the bid-ask spread of currency
pairs. However, we use the fractions of the Bank of International Settlement's triennial survey
on foreign exchange market activity. SizeFX jt is calculated as a three-year moving average of
the reported fractions. As a country-specic variable, SizeFX nt denotes the size of the foreign
exchange market of country n's currency. We expect SizeFX nt to have a positive eect on
27Krugman (1980) and Magee and Rao (1980) elaborate formally on the role of the lower transaction costs
in deep, resilient markets.
18PCI and negative eect on VCI. Intuitively, a large foreign exchange market of the exporter's
currency increases the use of his currency and reduces the need of a vehicle currency.
Baron (1976) was the rst to argue that exporters will prefer to invoice in the currency
whose relative price has the least volatility with a view to avoid revenue risk. Of course, rms
could use forward contracts and currency options to hedge currency risk, but these are rather
expensive methods for small rms and are typically not available for long time spans.28 The
expected exchange rate volatility between the chosen currency j and the Norwegian krone
(XVoltoNOK jt) is calculated as the coecient of variation of the nominal exchange rate
during the last four quarters. XVoltoNOK jt is expected to decrease the share of the chosen
currency, irrespective of the currency group. As a country-specic variable, XVoltoNOK nt
is the expected exchange rate volatility between country n's currency and the Norwegian
krone. XVoltoNOK nt is expected to be negative for the LCI and PCI shares and positive
for the VCI share. Intuitively, traders will shift away from LCI and PCI to a third currency
with lower volatility relative to the Norwegian krone or their home currency. Similarly, we
include XVoltoPartjnt, which represents the expected exchange rate volatility between the
chosen currency j and the producer's currency. This measure is also based on a four-quarter
moving average of the coecient of variation of the exchange rate. XVoltoPartjnt is expected
to decrease the share of the chosen currency, again regardless of the currency type.29
4.2.3 Trade Variables
A country's market share is a key determinant of invoicing currency choice (cf. Swoboda,
1968; Bacchetta and Van Wincoop, 2005; Ligthart and Da Silva, 2007). Bacchetta and Van
Wincoop (2005) argue that a larger world trade share increases a country's market power
and thus its ability to impose its currency upon the trading partner. WorldTradent denotes
a country's world trade share, which is calculated as the sum of the value of goods exports
and imports of country n divided by the sum of the value of world exports and imports of
28Borsum and Odegaard (2005) survey Norwegian rms about their currency hedging practices and nd that
small rms use more primitive hedging methods such as invoicing in the home currency, whereas large rms
use forward contracts and currency options.
29By construction XVoltoNOK lt for l = fn;jg and XVoltoPartjnt are zero for LCI and PCI, respectively.
XVoltoPartjnt is also the only variable that varies across currencies and countries.
19goods. The eect of WorldTradent is expected to be positive for PCI relative to invoicing in
the Norwegian krone (LCI). Because the need to use an international currency is reduced, the
eect on VCI should be negative.
McKinnon (1979) nds that homogeneous products that are traded on organized exchanges
(e.g., oil) are often priced and invoiced in leading vehicle currencies like the US dollar. In
addition, rms supplying dierentiated goods under monopolistic competition have market
power to set their prices freely and invoice in their own currency. However, Krugman (1987)
and Betts and Devereux (2000) point out that rms producing dierentiated nal goods
have an incentive to `price to market.' As a result, the share of dierentiated products of
partner country n, which we label Di nt, is expected to have a negative eect on VCI and
an ambiguous eect on LCI and PCI. Di nt is calculated as the sum of imported goods
that are classied to be dierentiated by the conservative specication of the Rauch index
(Rauch, 1999, p. 15) divided by the total value of Norwegian imports in that period. Rauch
(1999) classies commodities into three categories: traded on an organized exchange, reference
priced, and dierentiated at the three-digit and four-digit level of the Standard International
Trade Classication (SITC). The conservative Rauch index minimizes the number of three-
digit and four-digit commodities that are classied as either traded on an organized exchange
or reference priced, whereas the liberal Rauch index maximizes those numbers.
To control for the composition of trade across countries, the partner country's share in
total Norwegian trade NorwayTradent is included. In view of the gravity model (cf. Anderson,
1979), this variable captures the net eect on bilateral trade ows of distance (negative eect)
and a country's GDP (positive eect). NorwayTradent is not likely to aect the preferences for
either country's currency and, therefore, has an ambiguous eect on the trading partners' own
currency shares (i.e., PCI and LCI). However, the eect on VCI is expected to be negative.
Indeed, if goods markets of two economies are becoming more integrated there will be less
need for a third currency. NorwayTradent is dened as the sum of country n's value of goods
exports to and goods imports from Norway divided by the sum of Norway's goods exports
and imports.
205 Results
This section presents the econometric results. We start o with the benchmark model and
subsequently present alternative specications. Besides serving as robustness checks, the
alternative specications help us in positioning our results within the invoicing literature.
5.1 Currency-Specic and Country-Specic Variables
5.1.1 Benchmark Specication
Table 4 reports results for the xed eects benchmark model (labeled specication I), which
includes all variables of Section 4.2. The left panel of the table presents the average marginal
eects of country-specic variables for the currency groups LCI, PCI, and VCI. Reported
magnitudes represent the percentage point increase of currency share v with respect to a one
unit increase of the respective covariate. Variables showing signicant marginal eects are
ination volatility (CPIVolnt) for all three currency groups and the degree of dierentiated
products (Di nt) for LCI and VCI. The magnitudes of the ination rate (CPI nt) across cur-
rency groups are small and statistically insignicant for PCI and VCI. All three marginal
eects of the CPIVolnt variable have their expected sign. An increase of one standard devi-
ation in the ination volatility of the exporter's economy reduces the share of PCI by 10.7
percentage points and increases the use of the local currency and vehicle currencies by 6.8
and 3.9 percentage points, respectively. Note that the logit specication of the currency share
function ensures that the sum of the marginal eects always equals zero.
The eects for Di nt are much smaller: A 10 percentage points increase in the share
of dierentiated products decreases the use of vehicle currencies by 5 percentage points and
increases the use of the Norwegian krone by 5 percentage points. Hence, we nd support
for Krugman's (1987) pricing-to-market theory. This result may be due to the ecological
inference problem (cf. King, 1997), which may occur in studies using aggregate data. Given
that we do not have micro data, the large transaction sizes of large exporting rms|which are
more likely to commit to large local outposts and hence are more likely to price to market|
outweigh the small transaction sizes of small rms. Our qualitative nding on the LCI eect
21of dierentiated goods is in line with that found by Ligthart and Da Silva (2007)|who use a
more basic raw materials indicator|and Ito et al. (2010). However, we are the rst to nd
a signicant ination volatility eect.
The right panel of Table 4 presents the average marginal eects of the currency-specic
variables. Figures on the diagonal of each matrix represent the own eect and gures o
the diagonal denote cross eects (i.e., with respect to the other currency groups). We nd
signicant marginal eects for EURjt and EuroControljt. If the chosen currency is the euro,
then its share increases by 2.6 percentage points when used as a producer currency (see the
middle cell on the diagonal for the EURjt dummy), whereas if it is chosen as a vehicle currency
its share increases by almost 3 percentage points (see the bottom cell on the diagonal).30
Interestingly, as a counterfactual exercise, if the Norwegian krone were part of the eurozone,
its share would have increased by 3.6 percentage points (see the rst cell on the diagonal).
The coecient of EuroControljt indicates the speed of transition from the respective national
legacy currency to the euro (or to any other currency). If the exporter's currency is a currency
of the eurozone, then it reduces its invoicing share of the national legacy currency in any
quarter between 1999 and 2001 by 2.1 percentage points and its invoicing share of vehicle
currencies by 2.4 percentage points.
McFadden's pseudo R2 of the xed eects model is almost 0.4, which is rather high for this
type of nonlinear model and is much larger than in the model with country-specic covariates
only (see Section 5.2). With the exception of the time of euro introduction and the transition
period after introduction, the invoicing pattern is rather stable across time periods. However,
in view of the rather large change in invoicing practices after euro introduction, we ran a
structural break test with unknown change point as in Andrews (1993). We did not nd
evidence of a structural break, suggesting that our covariates account well enough for the
change.31
30In Section 5.2, we discuss the specication with country-specic variables only, which is the one commonly
used in the invoicing literature. In that section, we will further relate our ndings with those of the literature.
31Results of the structural break test can be found in Figure A.1 of Ligthart and Werner (2011).
225.1.2 Alternative Specications
Table 5 considers a pooled model that estimates a common intercept across countries (which
we label specication II). The model includes all variables of the benchmark model. Compared
to the xed eects model, we can see that the set of signicant marginal eects expands.
Within the set of country-specic marginal eects, we nd that invoicing shares are aected
by CPI nt and CPIVolnt for LCI, PCI, and VCI, Di nt for LCI and PCI, and NorwayTradent
for PCI and VCI. The marginal eect of CPIVolnt for PCI is doubled compared to the xed
eects specication. Rather large is the ination volatility eect, which also doubles. The
marginal eect of CPI nt has the same sign but it is much smaller than that of CPIVolnt.
As expected, NorwayTradent decreases the share of vehicle currency invoicing in Norwegian
imports. The marginal eects of the currency-specic variables EURjt, EuroControljt, and
SizeFX jt are signicant. The magnitudes for EURjt increase from 2.6 percentage points
in the benchmark case to 5.8 percentage points for PCI and from 3 percentage points to
6 percentage points for VCI. A 10 percentage points rise of a currency's foreign exchange
market share increases its PCI and VCI share by 2 percentage points, which is a rather small
magnitude.
One could argue that exporting rms located in a country whose currency has a deep and
resilient foreign exchange market prefer their own currency and choose less often a vehicle
currency; that is, SizeFX nt is a country-specic variable rather than a currency-specic vari-
able. We could also test whether traders choose a currency that has the least ination
volatility. Specifying ination volatility as a currency-specic variable (CPIVoljt) captures
ination volatility of the producer's currency relative to any other country's ination volatil-
ity including Norway's.32 Specication III in Table 6 considers a xed eects model in which
we include CPIVoljt and SizeFX nt instead of CPIVolnt and SizeFX jt. Signicant country-
specic marginal eects are SizeFX nt for LCI, PCI and VCI, CPI nt for LCI and PCI, and
Di nt for LCI and VCI. A 10 percentage point increase in the size of the partner currency's
foreign exchange market leads to an increase of 6 percentage points of the producer currency's
32Devereux et al. (2004) argue that a country's ination volatility only matters with respect to its trading
partner's ination volatility.
23share, a fall of almost 2 percentage points of the local currency share, and a decrease of around
4 percentage points of vehicle currencies. In addition, we see that the marginal eects of the
currency-specic variables EURjt, EuroControljt, and CPIVoljt are signicant. The magni-
tude of CPIVoljt as a currency-specic variable is much lower than that as a country-specic
variable. An increase of Norway's ination volatility by one standard deviation reduces the
invoicing share of the Norwegian krone by less than one percentage point. The same increase
of ination volatility of the exporter's currency depresses the invoicing share of the exporting
rm by less than half of a percentage point.
5.2 Country-Specic Variables
Specication IV in Table 7 presents results for the pooled model, in which we assume that
all explanatory variables are country specic. This specication is the standard model that
has been previously used in the invoicing literature, either in a nonlinear model with three
currency choices (cf. Wilander, 2006) or in a linear specication with one currency share
(Kamps, 2006; Goldberg and Tille, 2008). Failing to control for unobserved heterogeneity,
as is typical for invoicing studies, gives a greater number of signicant marginal eects of
the variables. We nd six signicant variables in the respective LCI and PCI groups and
seven in the VCI group. The marginal eects of ination and ination volatility have similar
magnitudes and signs as in specications I and II. In addition to these variables and the
euro dummy (in the case of PCI and VCI), we nd WorldTradent and XVoltoNOK nt for LCI
and VCI to be signicant. A one percentage point increase of WorldTradent increases PCI
by 8 percentage points, whereas LCI decreases by almost 13 percentage points. This result
supports the ndings of Ligthart and Da Silva (2007) and Goldberg and Tille (2008). In line
with expectations, XVoltoNOK nt reduces LCI and PCI and increases vehicle currency use.
This nding is in line with the qualitative results of Wilander (2006), who does not provide
average marginal eects. Compared to the benchmark specication, the pseudo R2 of 0.15 of
our alternative model is rather low.
The magnitude of the average marginal eect of the euro dummy is much larger than
that in the benchmark model (where it enters as a currency-specic variable): A country's
24membership of the eurozone increases PCI by 19 percentage points. Intuitively, there is much
more cross-sectional variation in the country-specic EURnt dummy than in the currency-
specic EURjt dummy. In addition, the presence of unobserved country-specic xed eects
that are correlated with the euro dummy may overstate the euro eect. The unobserved euro
eect reduces VCI by almost 20 percentage points, suggesting that eurozone countries have
been substituting away from vehicle currency use. However, this is only part of the story
given that the drop in ination volatility boosted the PCI shares of eurozone countries.
Specication V in Table 7 also considers country-specic variables only, but focuses on the
xed eects model. We nd roughly the same set of signicant variables as in specication III.
Compared to the pooled model, the magnitudes of the marginal eects are greatly reduced.
A country's membership of the eurozone now increases PCI by only 10.7 percentage points,
suggesting that time-invariant country-specic factors contribute substantially to explaining
the size of the PCI share. Kamps (2006) nds a marginal euro eect on PCI of 4.75 percent,
which is much smaller.33 Finally, the pseudo R2 of 0.22 is larger than its pooled counterpart,
but still considerably lower than the benchmark specication.
6 Conclusions
Has the euro aected the choice of invoicing currency? At rst sight, the answer to this
question seems an obvious `yes' given that the euro did not exist prior to 1999. However, we
are interested in measuring whether the euro has had an eect on the home currency share
of eurozone exporters (so-called producer currency invoicing) above and beyond their home
currency share prior to euro introduction. In addition, we measure the euro's eect on the
share of the importer's home currency and the shares of respective vehicle currencies. To this
end, we use quarterly data on the currency composition of Norwegian goods imports from
OECD countries covering the period 1996{2006.
The descriptive analysis shows that the introduction of the euro increases the producer
currency share of eurozone exporters at the expense of the Norwegian krone and vehicle
33However, it rather dicult to directly compare our ndings with this study because she estimates the
currency shares without any lower and upper bound and does not control for the interaction with other shares.
25currencies. In contrast, non-eurozone exporters experience a slight fall in their producer
currency share. However, the rise in the producer currency share of eurozone countries can
only be partly attributed to a substitution from eurozone vehicle currencies to the euro. We
also nd that the euro has replaced the US dollar as the dominant currency in the group of
vehicle currencies.
In the econometric analysis, we distinguish 31 currencies and calculate the corresponding
bilateral currency shares rather than focusing on a single currency share. This approach
allows to capture substitution eects between currencies owing to euro introduction. Currency
shares are explained by currency-specic variables as well as by country-specic variables while
controlling for unobserved country heterogeneity. The results for the xed eects benchmark
model reveal that the substantial rise in the share of producer currency invoicing by eurozone
countries is primarily caused by a drop in ination volatility and can only to a small extent
be explained by an unobserved euro eect. The introduction of the euro increases the share of
producer currency invoicing by eurozone countries by only 2.6 percentage points. If the euro is
chosen as a vehicle currency by non-eurozone countries its share rises by 3 percentage points.
This unobserved euro eect only materialized gradually, reecting the three-year transition
phase and hysteresis in invoicing practices.
The larger euro invoicing share in Norwegian imports has increased ceteris paribus Nor-
way's trade account exposure to exchange rate changes. A depreciation of the Norwegian
krone leads to a larger trade decit and more `imported ination' than before the introduc-
tion of the euro. Countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (GIPS) have enjoyed the
largest increases in their own currency share (i.e., the euro). In view of the recent eurozone
crisis, various observers have speculated about a likely exit of the GIPS countries from the
eurozone. In case of a eurozone breakup scenario, all trade payments of a country exiting the
eurozone may overnight be converted from euros into a new local currency at a xed conver-
sion rate. Such conversion could favorably aect prots of Norwegian importers, who used
to be invoiced in euros and will now be paid in the new local currency, as the new currency
may depreciate rapidly versus the euro and Norwegian krone.
We should note that all our results are derived based on data for a single country (Norway).
26However, the bilateral nature of the invoicing data allows us to capture both the observed and
unobserved characteristics of Norway's trading partners. Of course, invoicing data for a single
country could be aected more by idiosyncracies than in a pure cross-country analysis. Future
research could therefore usefully focus on checking the robustness of our ndings by analyzing
invoicing data for other countries than Norway and by studying time periods succeeding our
sample. Second, one could analyze invoicing transactions at the rm level, potentially via a
survey of eurozone rms. Such a micro-based approach has the advantage that information
on rm size and transaction volumes can be used in the analysis. This approach also allows
the use of pure discrete choice models with random taste variation.
27Figure 1: Currency Group Shares in Norwegian Imports
(a) Eurozone countries (equally weighted) (b) Eurozone countries (trade weighted)
















































(c) Euro and non-euro (equally weighted) (d) Euro and non-euro (trade weighted)






















PCI (Eurozone) + VCI (Eurozone)
PCI (Non−eurozone)






















PCI (Eurozone) + VCI (Eurozone)
PCI (Non−eurozone)
Notes: The data in Panels (a) and (b) pertain to all countries in the eurozone. The thick solid line
represents the share of local currency invoicing (LCI, i.e., the Norwegian krone), the dashed line denotes
the share of producer currency invoicing (PCI), and the dotted line depicts the share of vehicle currency
invoicing (VCI). The data in Panels (c) and (d) cover all OECD countries excluding Norway, where a
distinction is made between eurozone and non-eurozone countries. The thick solid line represents the PCI
share of countries in the eurozone and the dashed line denotes the PCI share of non-eurozone countries. The
bullet pointed line denotes the sum of the eurozone PCI and VCI shares. The rst vertical line indicates
the introduction of the euro in non-cash form and the second vertical line represents the introduction of
the euro in cash transactions.
28Figure 2: Vehicle Currency Shares in Norwegian Imports
(a) Non-eurozone countries (b) Non-eurozone countries
excluding the US (equally weighted) excluding the US (trade weighted)
















































Notes: The data in Panels (a) and (b) pertain to all OECD countries, except the United States and
eurozone countries. The thick solid line represents the share of vehicle currency invoicing in US dollar
(USD), the dashed line denotes the share of vehicle currency invoicing in the eurozone legacy currencies and
in the euro (EUR), and the dotted line depicts the share of vehicle currency invoicing in other currencies
(Other). The rst vertical line indicates the introduction of the euro in non-cash form and the second

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 2: Currency Group Shares by OECD Country, Averages for 1996{2006 (in Percent)
Country Import Currency Shares
Share LCI PCI VCI
Sweden 15.619 43.239 45.880 10.881
Germany 13.842 19.677 73.516 6.807
United Kingdom 8.074 27.694 43.359 28.947
Denmark 7.367 37.217 45.492 17.291
United States 6.400 16.121 71.487 12.392
Netherlands 4.522 27.144 53.956 18.900
France 4.479 31.630 55.079 13.291
Italy 3.771 31.586 55.709 12.705
Finland 3.480 61.422 33.262 5.316
Japan 3.415 38.116 21.798 40.085
Canada 2.378 4.378 75.311 20.311
Belgium 2.290 36.963 42.542 20.495
Spain 1.618 34.442 49.668 15.891
Ireland 1.457 33.957 16.198 49.845
Poland 1.234 38.228 1.673 60.099
Switzerland 1.229 25.808 45.922 28.271
Austria 0.912 28.854 60.444 10.702
Korea 0.713 24.273 0 75.727
Czech Republic 0.580 57.197 0.880 41.923
Portugal 0.575 55.399 30.513 14.089
Turkey 0.517 37.776 0 62.224
Hungary 0.408 49.612 0 50.388
Iceland 0.249 56.708 1.707 41.585
Australia 0.216 9.470 9.244 81.286
Mexico 0.129 29.698 0 70.302
Greece 0.127 42.195 34.570 23.235
Slovak Republic 0.117 44.067 0 55.933
Luxembourg 0.075 49.308 29.625 21.066
New Zealand 0.043 35.562 7.911 56.528
Average (equally weighted) 2.960 35.439 31.233 33.328
Notes: The countries are ranked by their share in Norwegian imports. To conserve on space,
columns (2){(4) report the currency shares for three aggregate currency groups using equation (2):
LCI, PCI, and VCI refer to the invoicing share of the local currency (Norwegian krone), currencies
of partner countries (i.e., the producer currencies), and vehicle currencies, respectively. An asterisk
indicates that the country is a member of the eurozone on January 1, 2002. All currency fractions
are averaged across 1996{2006 and expressed in percentages.
31Table 3: Vehicle Currency Shares, 1996 and 2006 (in Percent)
Year Currencies Share of All Share of All
Currencies Vehicle Currencies
1996 Total 37.4666 100.0000
US dollar 19.7697 52.7662
Eurozone 12.0287 32.1052
German mark 10.1230 27.0186
Dutch guilder 0.6693 1.7864
Belgian franc 0.4894 1.3062
ECU 0.3444 0.9192
Austrian schilling 0.1645 0.4392
French franc 0.1381 0.3685
Finnish mark 0.0529 0.1411
Italian lira 0.0258 0.0689
Irish pound 0.0113 0.0302
Spanish peseta 0.0072 0.0193
Portuguese escudo 0.0028 0.0075
Non-eurozone 5.6682 15.1286
Swedish krona 3.4730 9.2697
Danish krone 1.1570 3.0881
Pound sterling 0.7503 2.0026
Swiss franc 0.2421 0.6463
Japanese yen 0.0389 0.1037
Canadian dollar 0.0060 0.0160
Australian dollar 0.0007 0.0018
Iceland krona 0.0001 0.0003
2006 Total 30.9928 100.0000
Euro 14.6061 47.1274
US dollar 12.8751 41.5424
Swedish krona 2.1265 6.8612
Danish krone 0.9188 2.9644
Pound sterling 0.3650 1.1777
Swiss franc 0.0533 0.1721
Japanese yen 0.0237 0.0763
Canadian dollar 0.0175 0.0566
Czech koruna 0.0027 0.0087
Polish zloty 0.0025 0.0080
Australian dollar 0.0015 0.0047
New Zealand dollar 0.0001 0.0003
Iceland krona 0.0000 0.0001
Notes: The rst column with data presents the average trade-weighted currency
shares with respect to all currencies, whereas the second column shows the currency
shares with respect to all vehicle currencies. All currency fractions are expressed in
percentages.Table 4: Average Marginal Eects for the Benchmark Model (Specication I)
Country Specic Currency Specic
LCI EUR
LCI PCI VCI
CPI 0.0061* LCI 0.0361*** -0.0164*** -0.0197*
(0.0032) (0.0046) (0.0022) (0.0114)
CPIVol 0.0678*** PCI 0.0263*** -0.0098***
(0.0127) (0.0035) (0.0029)




Di 0.0051** LCI PCI VCI
(0.0024) LCI -0.0290*** 0.0131*** 0.0158
(0.0059) (0.0027) (0.0097)
PCI PCI -0.0211*** 0.0079***
(0.0044) (0.0027)




WorldTrade 0.0006 LCI PCI VCI
(0.0270) LCI 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001
NorwayTrade 0.0025 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
(0.0090) PCI 0.0001 -0.0001





CPI 0.0005 LCI PCI VCI
(0.0020) LCI 0.1052 -0.0476 -0.0574
CPIVol 0.0388*** (0.0761) (0.0346) (0.0549)
(0.0124) PCI 0.0764 -0.0287





(0.0014) LCI PCI VCI
LCI -0.1342 0.0608 0.0732
Diagnostics (0.0841) (0.0384) (0.0662)
PCI -0.0975 0.0366
Observations 1,276 (0.0617) (0.0269)
Log-Likelihood -2,493.17 VCI -0.1100
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.39 (0.0718)
Notes: The dependent variable denotes currency share j of country n at time t. The left-hand side gives the average
marginal eects for the country-specic variables, whereas the right-hand side presents the average marginal eects
for the currency-specic variables. The latter panel presents on the diagonal the elasticities with respect to the own
currency group and reports o-diagonal the elasticities with respect to the other currency group (i.e., PCI, LCI, and
VCI). ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses below the estimated average marginal eects. A y indicates that we have averaged the EuroControl dummy
across all n countries and t = 1999Q1;:::;2001Q4 (i.e., the transition period).Table 5: Average Marginal Eects for Specication II
Country Specic Currency Specic
LCI EUR
LCI PCI VCI
CPI 0.0211*** LCI 0.0737*** -0.0355*** -0.0375*
(0.0027) (0.0051) (0.0027) (0.0213)
CPIVol 0.1225*** PCI 0.0576*** -0.0218**
(0.0181) (0.0042) (0.0100)




Di 0.0019*** LCI PCI VCI
(0.0005) LCI -0.0444*** 0.0214*** 0.0226*
(0.0066) (0.0033) (0.0136)
PCI PCI -0.0347*** 0.0131**
(0.0052) (0.0066)




WorldTrade 0.0057 LCI PCI VCI
(0.0077) LCI 0.0025*** -0.0012*** -0.0013*
NorwayTrade 0.0242*** (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0008)
(0.0028) PCI 0.0020*** -0.0007**





CPI 0.0139** LCI PCI VCI
(0.0060) LCI -0.1760* 0.0847* 0.0896
CPIVol 0.0823** (0.1036) (0.0493) (0.0582)
(0.0362) PCI -0.1377* 0.0521*





(0.0004) LCI PCI VCI
LCI 0.0340 -0.0164 -0.0173
Diagnostics (0.1017) (0.0488) (0.0488)
PCI 0.0266 -0.0101
Observations 1,276 (0.0794) (0.0285)
Log-Likelihood -2,614.15 VCI 0.0277
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.36 (0.0804)
Notes: The dependent variable denotes currency share j of country n at time t. The left-hand side gives the average
marginal eects for the country-specic variables, whereas the right-hand side presents the average marginal eects
for the currency-specic variables. The latter panel presents on the diagonal the elasticities with respect to the own
currency group and reports o-diagonal the elasticities with respect to the other currency group (i.e., PCI, LCI, and
VCI). ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses below the estimated average marginal eects. A y indicates that we have averaged the EuroControl dummy
across all n countries and t = 1999Q1;:::;2001Q4 (i.e., the transition period).Table 6: Average Marginal Eects for Specication III
Country Specic Currency Specic
LCI EUR
LCI PCI VCI
CPI 0.0108*** LCI 0.0194*** -0.0087*** -0.0107*
(0.0028) (0.0044) (0.0020) (0.0055)
SizeFX -0.0019** PCI 0.0139*** -0.0052***
(0.0009) (0.0032) (0.0017)




Di 0.0054*** LCI PCI VCI
(0.0020) LCI -0.0382*** 0.0171*** 0.0211***
(0.0050) (0.0022) (0.0082)
PCI PCI -0.0274*** 0.0102***
(0.0036) (0.0023)




WorldTrade 0.0005 LCI PCI VCI
(0.0286) LCI -0.0060*** 0.0027*** 0.0033**
NorwayTrade 0.0021 (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0016)
(0.0089) PCI -0.0043*** 0.0016***





CPI 0.0028 LCI PCI VCI
(0.0020) LCI 0.1298 -0.0581 -0.0715
SizeFX -0.0042*** (0.0839) (0.0378) (0.0612)
(0.0009) PCI 0.0930 -0.0347





(0.0013) LCI PCI VCI
LCI -0.0348 0.0156 0.0191
Diagnostics (0.0862) (0.0387) (0.0498)
PCI -0.0249 0.0093
Observations 1,276 (0.0619) (0.0237)
Log-Likelihood -2,252.63 VCI -0.0285
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.39 (0.0712)
Notes: The dependent variable denotes currency share j of country n at time t. The left-hand side gives the average
marginal eects for the country-specic variables, whereas the right-hand side presents the average marginal eects
for the currency-specic variables. The latter panel presents on the diagonal the elasticities with respect to the own
currency group and reports o-diagonal the elasticities with respect to the other currency group (i.e., PCI, LCI, and
VCI). ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses below the estimated average marginal eects. A y indicates that we have averaged the EuroControl dummy
























































McFadden Pseudo R2 0.15 0.22
Notes: The dependent variable denotes currency share j of country n at time t. The
columns present the average marginal eects for country-specic variables only. ***, **,
* denote signicance at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses below the estimated average marginal eects.Appendix
This Appendix explains how our model fullls the asymptotic properties of the score identity
and derives the average marginal eects.
A.1 Score Identity of Currency Shares
We know from maximum likelihood theory that the expected value of the score at the true
parameter value  is zero:
E0[gnt()] = 0; (A.1)









j=1 sjnt ln^ Sjnt
@
= Z0
nt(snt   ^ Snt); (A.3)
where both vectors snt and ^ Snt have dimension J  1. The observation's score with respect
to the country-specic vector v is:
@
PJ





(sjnt   ^ Sjnt); (A.4)
where Jv is the number of currencies in currency group v. Since Znt and xjnt are non-zero,
equality (A.1) only holds true when sjnt = ^ Sjnt for all j. Note that the scores used by Papke
and Wooldridge (1996) are a special case of equation (A.4) with J = 2 and no currency
groups; that is, xjnt(sjnt   ^ Sjnt).
A.2 Average Marginal Eects
This section derives the mathematical expressions underlying the average marginal eects,
which are calculated in Tables 4{7. The marginal eect measures the eect of a change in the
regressor on the conditional probability that a currency is chosen with unit probability. There
37are dierent ways to measure marginal eects because they vary with the point of evaluation.
The most common form in the invoicing literature|and the international economics literature
more generally|is marginal eects at the sample mean of the regressors (cf. Donnenfeld and
Haug, 2008; Wilander, 2006). Alternatively, one could use average marginal eects, which
are computed as means of marginal eects over all observations. Although marginal eects
at the mean are an asymptotically valid approximation of average marginal eects (Greene,
1997, p. 876), the current econometric practice favors the latter. Papke and Wooldridge
(2008) derive average marginal eects in the context of a binary fractional probit model. We
propose average marginal eects to be used for our compositional multinomial logit model.
For currency-specic variables, the average marginal eect for currency group v is cal-
















is the predicted group share summed across the predicted currency shares in group v with
Jv currencies. Equation (A.5) shows the change in the share function of choosing currency
group v when the rth currency-specic explanatory variable increases by one unit for currency











which represents the change in the predicted share of currency group v when the rth country-
specic explanatory variable increases by one unit.
Because logit probabilities have closed-form solutions, the marginal eects for (A.5) can







^ Svnt(1   ^ Sknt)^ r; (A.8)







( ^ Svnt)^ Sknt^ r; (A.9)
for k 6= v.
In the case of dummy variables (denoted by d) such as EURjt and EuroControljt the








^ Svnt(jd = 1)   ^ Sunt(jd = 0)
i
; (A.10)








^ Svnt(jd = 1)   ^ Sknt(jd = 0)
i
; (A.11)
for k 6= v. To arrive at the marginal eect of EuroControljt, we average across the transition
period only.
39Table A.1: Data Description and Sources
Variable Description Primary Source
sjnt Fraction of Norwegian goods imports from partner
country n that is invoiced in currency j at time t.
The currency shares are calculated from aggregated
bilateral import values using equation (1) of the main
text. Because the bilateral import values (mjnt) are
reported in the Norwegian krone (NOK), we apply





where Xjt denotes the period average exchange rate
of currency j with respect to the Norwegian krone at
time t and the superscripts A and R denote adjusted
and reported, respectively.
The currency shares are derived
from customs data provided by
Statistics Norway. The period
average exchange rates are
taken from the IMF's (2009)
International Financial
Statistics (IFS).
EURnt Dummy variable taking on a value of one from Jan-
uary 1, 1999 onward if the partner country n is part
of the eurozone.
European Central Bank (ECB)
http://www.ecb.int/
EURjt Dummy variable taking on a value of one from Jan-
uary 1, 1999 onward if the chosen currency j is part
of the eurozone (i.e., a legacy currency) or is the euro




EuroControljt Dummy variable taking on a value of one if the cho-
sen currency j is one of the legacy currencies between
January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2001.
ECB
http://www.ecb.int/
CPI nt Expected ination rate of partner country n at time
t (in percent). Calculated as a 4-period moving av-




CPIVolnt Expected ination volatility of partner country n at
time t. Calculated as the standard deviation of the
CPI of the four preceding quarters.
IMF's IFS
http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/
CPIVoljt Expected ination volatility of partner country n or
country group using currency j at time t. Calculated




Continued on next page
40Table A.1: Data Description and Sources (Continued)
Variable Description Primary Source
SizeFX nt Depth of the foreign exchange market of the currency
of country n at time t. Calculated based on the Tri-
ennial Central Bank Survey: Foreign Exchange and
Derivatives Market Activity conducted by the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS). The survey re-
ports the currency distribution of foreign exchange
market turnover during a given day. A 3-year mov-
ing average of fractions of the individual currencies
is used to determine the foreign exchange market
depth. Surveys relevant to our study were conducted




SizeFX jt Depth of the foreign exchange market of currency j
at time t. See above.
BIS (2007)
http://www.bis.org/statistics
XVoltoNOK nt Expected volatility of the exchange rate of the Nor-
wegian krone (NOK) with respect to the currency
of country n time t. Calculated as the coecient of
variation of the four preceding quarters.
IMF's IFS
http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/
XVoltoNOK jt Expected volatility of the exchange rate of the Nor-
wegian krone (NOK) with respect to the chosen cur-
rency j at time t. Calculated as the coecient of
variation of the four preceding quarters.
IMF's IFS
http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/
XVoltoPartjnt Expected volatility of the exchange rate of the pro-
ducer currency with respect to the chosen currency
j at time t. Calculated as the coecient of variation
of the four preceding quarters.
IMF's IFS
http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/
WorldTradent World trade share of country n at time t (in percent).
Dened as the sum of the value of goods exports and
imports of country n divided by the sum of the value
of world exports and imports.
OECD trade data
http://www.oecd.org/statsportal/
NorwayTradent Goods trade share of country n with Norway at time
t (in percent). Dened as the sum of country n's
value of exports to and imports from Norway divided
by the sum of Norway's goods exports and imports.
Statistics Norway
http://www.ssb.no/en/
Di nt Share of dierentiated goods in Norwegian imports
from country n in year t (in percent). Calculated as
the sum of imported goods that are classied (based
on SITC 4) to be dierentiated by the conservative
specication of the Rauch-Index (cf. Rauch, 1999)
divided by total value of Norwegian imports in that
period.
Statistics Norway
41Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics
Obs Mean St. dev Min Max
Currency shares
Norwegian krone 1,276 0.3544 0.1577 0.0149 0.7995
Australian dollar 1,276 0.0033 0.0183 0 0.2016
Canadian dollar 1,276 0.0261 0.1387 0 0.8704
Czech koruna 1,276 0.0003 0.0018 0 0.0204
Danish krone 1,276 0.0280 0.0822 0 0.5354
Hungarian forint 1,276 0 0 0 0
Iceland krona 1,276 0.0006 0.0040 0 0.0650
Japanese yen 1,276 0.0078 0.0423 0 0.4854
Mexican peso 1,276 0 0 0 0
New Zealand dollar 1,276 0.0027 0.0169 0 0.2421
Polish zloty 1,276 0.0006 0.0051 0 0.0768
Pound sterling 1,276 0.0253 0.0826 0 0.5633
Slovak koruna 1,276 0 0 0 0
South Korean won 1,276 0 0 0 0
Swedish krona 1,276 0.0401 0.0823 0 0.5091
Swiss franc 1,276 0.0174 0.0878 0 0.6890
Turkish lira 1,276 0 0 0 0
US dollar 1,276 0.1680 0.1982 0 0.8949
Euro 928 0.2090 0.2317 0 0.9260
Austrian schilling 725 0.0084 0.0556 0 0.5914
Belgian franc 725 0.0062 0.0326 0 0.2851
Dutch guilder 725 0.0110 0.0533 0 0.4871
Finnish mark 725 0.0032 0.0230 0 0.2577
French franc 725 0.0086 0.0573 0 0.5321
German mark 725 0.0616 0.1159 0 0.7612
Greek drachma 725 0.0011 0.0112 0 0.1685
Irish pound 725 0.0011 0.0087 0 0.1568
Italian lira 725 0.0072 0.0498 0 0.4651
Luxembourg franc 725 0.0008 0.0082 0 0.1530
Portuguese escudo 725 0.0011 0.0079 0 0.0879
Spanish peseta 725 0.0049 0.0356 0 0.3293
ECU 348 0.0011 0.0048 0 0.0643
Explanatory variables
EURnt 1,276 0.2955 0.4564 0 1.0000
EURjt 1,276 0.1585 0.3652 0 1.0000
EuroControljt 1,276 0.1303 0.3366 0 1.0000
CPI nt 1,276 5.1098 11.2552 -1.0076 93.7205
CPI jt 1,276 5.4667 11.8765 -1.0076 93.7205
CPIVolnt 1,276 0.7962 1.6186 0.0331 21.5883
SizeFX nt 1,276 8.3405 10.4873 0.0100 45.1500
SizeFX jt 1,276 3.6759 8.9979 0 45.1500
XVoltoNOK nt 1,276 0.0304 0.0297 0.0015 0.3326
XVoltoNOK jt 1,276 0.0300 0.0317 0 0.3326
XVoltoPartjnt 1,276 0.0367 0.0408 0 0.3684
WorldTradent 1,276 0.7273 0.8840 0.0082 4.4337
NorwayTradent 1,276 2.9284 3.6811 0.0293 15.5398
Di nt 1,276 74.1243 20.7023 11.7460 99.0010
Notes: The variables are described in Table A.1.
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